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________________                              
 
  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Unlike many of its sister states, Pennsylvania allows 
felons to vote immediately upon release from prison.  In an 
effort to correct widespread belief to the contrary, a coalition 
of public-interest organizations set out to run an 
advertisement informing ex-prisoners that they have the right 
to vote and encouraging them to exercise it.  The coalition 
asked the Port Authority of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
to place the ad in its buses.  The Port Authority denied the 
request, pointing to its written advertising policy, which 
prohibits ―noncommercial‖ ads.  The coalition sued, alleging 
a violation of the First Amendment.  The case proceeded to a 
bench trial, where the coalition proved that despite its written 
advertising policy, the Port Authority had accepted many 
noncommercial ads in recent years, several of which bore a 
striking resemblance to the coalition‘s ad.  Based mainly on 
this ―comparator‖ evidence, the District Court found that the 
rejection of the coalition‘s ad amounted to viewpoint 
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.  We will 
affirm.   
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I. BACKGROUND 
Many of Pennsylvania‘s ex-prisoners do not know they 
have the right to vote.  Seeing a need for public education, a 
coalition of public-interest groups, including the ACLU and 
the Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Education Fund, 
teamed up to start the ―Ex-Offender Voting Rights Project.‖  
The aims of the Project were to inform ex-prisoners that they 
have the right to vote, register them to vote, encourage them 
to vote, and—in the event ex-prisoners were denied the 
franchise—litigate on their behalf.   
The coalition determined that running ads in public 
buses would be an effective way to reach its target audience, 
so Lisa Krebbs, an employee of the ACLU, contacted the Port 
Authority on the coalition‘s behalf.  Krebbs was referred to 
Anthony Hickton, the Port Authority‘s Director of Sales.  She 
identified herself as an ACLU employee, described the Ex-
Offender Voting Rights Project, and informed Hickton that 
the coalition was interested in placing an ad in city buses.  
Although no draft had yet been prepared, she explained that 
the ad would inform ex-prisoners that they have the right to 
vote, encourage them to vote, and provide a phone number 
that they could call if they needed help or had questions.  
Hickton told Krebbs that the Port Authority would not run the 
ad.  He explained that the ad as described did not comply with 
the Port Authority‘s written advertising policy, which 
prohibited ―noncommercial‖ advertisements.   
The coalition tried several times to persuade the Port 
Authority to reverse course.  It corresponded with Hickton 
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and the Port Authority‘s in-house counsel Chris Hess, 
explaining that its advertisement was no different from many 
other noncommercial ads commonly displayed in Port 
Authority buses.  Hickton and Hess refused to budge. The 
coalition therefore filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging a violation of the First Amendment‘s Free Speech 
Clause.  The complaint asserted, first, that the Port 
Authority‘s advertising space is a public forum and that 
rejecting the coalition‘s ad thus amounted to impermissible 
content-based discrimination.  Second, the complaint asserted 
that the Port Authority had rejected the coalition‘s ad as a 
result of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.   
While the lawsuit was pending, the parties and their 
attorneys met to discuss a possible settlement.  During the 
meeting, Hess asserted—for the first time—that the Port 
Authority had rejected the coalition‘s ad not just because it 
was ―noncommercial‖ but also because it was ―political,‖ 
another subject matter banned under the advertising policy.  
Ultimately no settlement was reached, and the litigation 
proceeded apace.     
After the close of discovery, the parties filed cross 
motions for summary judgment.  The District Court denied 
the coalition‘s motion.  The Court granted the Port 
Authority‘s motion on the content-based-discrimination 
claim, holding that the advertising space is not a public 
forum.  But the Court denied its motion as to the viewpoint-
discrimination claim, concluding that a genuine dispute 
existed about whether the Port Authority had rejected the 
coalition‘s ad because of hostility towards the ad‘s message.  
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What remained of the § 1983 suit—the viewpoint-
discrimination claim—was scheduled for a bench trial.    
The trial lasted five days, and the Court heard 
testimony from a number of witnesses, including Hickton and 
Hess, the decisionmakers responsible for rejecting the 
coalition‘s ad.  In support of the Port Authority‘s position, 
Hess testified that he had once rejected an ―ad from the 
League of Women Voters that just sort of said ‗vote.‘‖  JA 
1428.  Hess and Hickton, moreover, offered definitions of the 
terms ―political‖ and ―commercial,‖ which are not defined in 
the advertising policy.  Their definitions differed somewhat, 
but they agreed that an ad is not commercial unless it in some 
way promotes the monetary interests of the advertiser.     
The Court also received evidence about other ads that 
the Port Authority has run in its buses.  As it turns out, the 
Port Authority has not consistently adhered to the advertising 
policy‘s ban on noncommercial ads.  It has run a number of 
noncommercial ads in recent years, including ads placed by 
organizations known as Just Harvest, the Fair Housing 
Partnership, and the Women‘s Law Project.   
Just Harvest is a nonprofit organization dedicated to 
the elimination of poverty and hunger.  Its advertisement 
(which Hickton acknowledged was not commercial in nature) 
informed low earners about their entitlement to the earned 
income tax credit, a refundable tax credit given to low-
income workers and their families.  The ad also stated that 
Just Harvest would prepare simple tax returns for low-income 
workers free of charge.   
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The Fair Housing Partnership is a nonprofit group 
committed to fighting housing discrimination.  Its ad 
informed the public that housing discrimination is illegal and 
provided a phone number that people could call if they had 
questions or needed help.  The Partnership does not charge 
for its services, and Hickton knew this when he accepted the 
ad.   
The Women‘s Law Project is a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to advancing the rights and status of women.  When 
originally submitted, the Project‘s ad said, ―Just because 
you‘re young doesn‘t mean you don‘t have rights.  Call the 
Women‘s Law Project for free legal information.‖  Refusing 
to accept the ad as submitted, Hess recommended that ―free 
legal information‖ be changed to ―confidential legal 
services.‖  Although ―free legal information‖ was more 
accurate (when a woman called she would typically receive 
free information, not legal services), the Project acquiesced in 
Hess‘ recommendation and the ad was run.   
 After the trial, the District Court issued an opinion 
concluding that the Port Authority had rejected the coalition‘s 
ad as a result of viewpoint discrimination.  The Court found, 
first, that the Port Authority did not really reject the ad 
because of its supposed political character.  Because the Port 
Authority did not mention this basis until after the litigation 
had begun, the Court found that it was merely a post hoc 
rationalization for the rejection.  The Court concluded, 
moreover, that the Port Authority‘s claim that it had rejected 
the ad because it was noncommercial was a pretext for 
viewpoint discrimination.  The Court found that the ads 
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placed by Just Harvest, the Fair Housing Partnership, and the 
Women‘s Law Project were—like the coalition‘s proposed 
ad—noncommercial ads designed to educate readers about 
their legal rights.  That the Port Authority had accepted these 
ads, but rejected the coalition‘s ad for the stated reason that it 
was noncommercial, raised an inference of viewpoint 
discrimination that the Port Authority had failed to rebut.   
 The Port Authority appealed.    
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343.  We have final-order jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court‘s legal conclusions 
de novo, and ordinarily review its factual findings for clear 
error.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); McCutcheon v. America’s 
Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009).  In Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984), however, 
the Supreme Court instructed that ―in cases raising First 
Amendment issues[,] an appellate court has an obligation to 
‗make an independent examination of the whole record.‖‘  Id. 
at 499 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 
(1964)).  Independent fact review is necessary, Bose 
explained, ―to make sure that ‗the [trial court‘s] judgment 
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression,‘‖ id. (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285), and to 
provide appellate courts with greater control over the case-by-
case elaboration of First Amendment principles, id. at 501–
03.   
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Bose‘s law-refinement purpose is triggered in all First 
Amendment cases, but its speaker-protection purpose is 
triggered only in cases where the speaker lost at the trial 
level.  See Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of 
Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright 
Cases, 107 Yale L.J. 2431, 2442–43 (1998).  It is therefore 
unclear whether Bose applies to First Amendment cases 
generally, or whether it is limited to First Amendment cases 
in which the speaker unsuccessfully claimed a violation of 
free speech rights in the trial court.  There are circuit 
decisions on both sides of the question.  Compare Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 
1229 (7th Cir. 1985) (Bose applies only when the speaker lost 
at the trial level), with Bartimo v. Horsemen’s Benevolent & 
Protective Ass’n, 771 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1985) (Bose 
applies to First Amendment cases generally).  This is a 
substantial legal issue, but we decline to weigh in on it.  We 
need not take sides on the question of Bose‘s application here 
because we would uphold the District Court‘s finding of 
viewpoint discrimination under either the Bose or clear-error 
standard.     
III. MERITS 
 The government does not have ―to grant access to all 
who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type 
of [public] property without regard to the nature of the 
property or to the disruption that might be caused by the 
speaker‘s activities.‖  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 (1985).  The 
Supreme Court has developed a forum analysis to determine 
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when the government‘s interest in limiting the use of its 
property outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the 
property as a place for expressive activity.  Id.   
There are three types of fora.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010).  On one end of 
the spectrum lie traditional public fora.  These fora, of which 
public streets and parks are examples, ―‗have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.‘‖  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting Hague v. 
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).  In traditional public fora, 
content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict 
scrutiny (i.e., the restrictions must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling governmental interest).  Id.  Next are 
designated public fora.  These fora consist of public property 
―that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum‖ 
but that the government has intentionally opened up for use 
by the public as a place for expressive activity.  Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).  As is 
the case in traditional public fora, content-based restrictions 
are subject to strict scrutiny in designated public fora.  Perry, 
460 U.S. at 45.  Finally, public property that ―is not by 
tradition or designation a forum for public communication‖ 
constitutes a nonpublic forum.  Id. at 46.  Access to a 
nonpublic forum can be restricted so long as the restrictions 
are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 
800. 
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 The parties agree that the advertising space in Port 
Authority buses is not a traditional public forum.  They 
disagree, though, over whether the space constitutes a 
designated public forum or a nonpublic forum.  The coalition 
argues that the space is a designated public forum because the 
Port Authority‘s practice has been to accept virtually all ads 
from all advertisers.  The Port Authority disagrees, asserting 
that the space is a nonpublic forum because it has consistently 
refused to accept, for example, political ads.  See Port Auth. 
Br. at 55 (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298 (1974)).  Although the parties have briefed and argued 
the issue, we need not tackle the forum-selection question.  
Regardless of whether the advertising space is a public or 
nonpublic forum, the coalition is entitled to relief because it 
has established viewpoint discrimination.       
Viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government 
―targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by 
speakers on a subject.‖  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).  See also Ridley v. 
Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 82 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that the government engages in viewpoint 
discrimination when it suppresses speech because it disagrees 
with ―the underlying ideology or perspective that the speech 
expresses‖).  Viewpoint discrimination is anathema to free 
expression and is impermissible in both public and nonpublic 
fora.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); 
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.  So if the government allows speech on 
a certain subject, it must accept all viewpoints on the subject, 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, even those that it disfavors or that 
are unpopular, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.  See also 
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Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384, 392–93 (1993) (where government allowed 
nonpublic forum to be used for discussion of certain subjects, 
it could not deny access to those wishing to discuss the 
subjects from a religious standpoint). 
The Port Authority claims to have rejected the 
coalition‘s ad on the grounds that it was ―political‖ and 
―noncommercial‖—two types of ads that are banned under 
the advertising policy.  The ―political‖ ground can quickly be 
dismissed.  Because the Port Authority did not mention this 
basis until after the lawsuit had been filed, the District Court 
permissibly found that it was not a real basis for rejecting the 
ad but was, instead, a post hoc rationalization.  And in any 
event it is less than obvious that the ad could even be 
considered ―political‖ in nature.  It would not have called on 
citizens to, say, vote for a specific candidate or publicly 
support a certain cause.  Cf. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 317 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a ―public service ad 
by the League of Women Voters . . . advertising the existence 
of an upcoming election and imploring citizens to vote‖ 
would not qualify as a ―political‖ ad in the ordinary sense of 
the word).         
The Port Authority‘s explanation that it rejected the 
coalition‘s ad because of its noncommercial character 
requires more analysis.  This is a viewpoint-neutral 
explanation for the rejection, see id. at 304 (majority 
opinion); Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 
972, 979–80 (9th Cir. 1998), and the Port Authority has 
consistently relied on it since Hickton‘s initial rejection of the 
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ad.  As in the employment-discrimination context, however, 
the recitation of a nondiscriminatory rationale is not sufficient 
standing alone because it could be a cover-up for unlawful 
discrimination.  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812.  As the First 
Circuit explained in a case similar to this one:  
There are various situations which will lead a 
court to conclude that, despite the seemingly 
neutral justifications offered by the government, 
nonetheless the decision to exclude speech is a 
form of impermissible discrimination. . . . First, 
statements by government officials on the 
reasons for an action can indicate an improper 
motive. Second, where the government states 
that it rejects something because of a certain 
characteristic, but other things possessing the 
same characteristic are accepted, this sort of 
underinclusiveness raises a suspicion that the 
stated neutral ground for action is meant to 
shield an impermissible motive. Third, 
suspicion arises where the viewpoint-neutral 
ground is not actually served very well by the 
specific governmental action at issue; where, in 
other words, the fit between means and ends is 
loose or nonexistent.  
Ridley, 390 F.3d at 87 (citations and footnote omitted); cf. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).    
The coalition is not armed with direct evidence of 
discrimination.  This is hardly surprising.  ―[T]he government 
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rarely flatly admits it is engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination.‖  Ridley, 390 F.3d at 86.  Nor is there a lack 
of fit between the Port Authority‘s viewpoint-neutral 
explanation (i.e., that it only accepts commercial ads) and its 
rejection of the coalition‘s ad.  It is beyond dispute that the 
coalition‘s ad was not commercial in nature.  To establish 
viewpoint discrimination, then, the coalition has advanced a 
comparator analysis.  It argues that although the Port 
Authority says it rejected the ad for being noncommercial, it 
accepted several other noncommercial advertisements, 
thereby raising a suspicion of viewpoint discrimination.     
The coalition focuses on the ads placed by Just 
Harvest, the Fair Housing Partnership, and the Women‘s Law 
Project.  The District Court determined that these ads were 
similar to the coalition‘s proposed advertisement.  Most 
importantly the Court found that the ads, like the coalition‘s, 
were noncommercial in nature.  The Port Authority 
challenges this finding, arguing that the comparator ads were 
in fact commercial because they promoted the provision of 
services.  This is wrong.  At most the comparator ads 
promoted the provision of free services, and the record is 
filled with evidence, including testimony from Hickton and 
Hess, that the Port Authority did not consider ads promoting 
free services to be commercial.  This makes sense: providing 
free services is ordinarily thought to be a form of charity, not 
commercial activity.  That the Port Authority accepted several 
noncommercial ads, but rejected the coalition‘s ad for the 
stated reason that it was noncommercial, was evidence that 
the District Court could properly consider as strongly 
suggesting viewpoint discrimination.  See Cornelius, 473 U.S. 
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at 812; Ridley, 390 F.3d at 87; Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 
702, 709–11 (8th Cir. 2000); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 
Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 9–12 (1st Cir. 
1994).   
The suspicion of viewpoint discrimination is fortified 
by the high degree of similarity between the coalition‘s ad 
and the comparator ads.  As the District Court observed, the 
coalition‘s ad and the comparator ads were all designed to 
educate readers about their legal rights.  The coalition‘s ad 
would have informed ex-prisoners that they have the right to 
vote and provided a number they could call with questions.  
Similarly, the Just Harvest ad educated low earners about 
their right to the earned income tax credit and about Just 
Harvest‘s free tax preparation services.  The Fair Housing 
Partnership‘s ad informed readers that they have a right to be 
free from housing discrimination and provided a number they 
could call if they had questions.  The Women‘s Law Project‘s 
ad was designed to advise young women about a resource for 
obtaining free information regarding their legal rights.  The 
similarity between the comparator ads and the coalition‘s ad 
is unmistakable, and thus provides firm ground for the 
District Court‘s finding of viewpoint discrimination.   
 The Port Authority says the District Court‘s finding of 
viewpoint discrimination was erroneous for two reasons.  
First, it points to Hess‘ testimony that he once rejected an ad 
from the League of Women Voters that simply encouraged 
people to vote.  Stressing the similarity between the League‘s 
ad and the coalition‘s, the Port Authority argues that this 
testimony proves that it rejected the coalition‘s ad not because 
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of hostility towards the ad‘s message but because the ad (like 
the League‘s) was noncommercial.  We agree that this 
testimony cut against a finding of viewpoint discrimination.  
But the District Court weighed it against the coalition‘s 
comparator evidence and found that the comparator evidence 
more compellingly favored a finding of viewpoint 
discrimination.  We see no error here.   
As between evidence that a decisionmaker acted at 
odds with a nondiscriminatory rationale and evidence that the 
decisionmaker acted consistently with the rationale, the 
former is often stronger proof of discrimination than the latter 
is of nondiscrimination.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
804.  Suppose, for example, that a company fired a black 
employee for the stated reason that she had missed work on 
three occasions.  Suppose further that the company had 
refused to fire three white employees who had missed work 
three times but that it had terminated one white employee 
who had thrice missed work.  The fact finder in this 
hypothetical case could permissibly infer that the company‘s 
race-neutral rationale was a pretext for discrimination even 
though the company had fired a white employee who had 
missed work on three occasions.  See Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146–48 (2000); 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Pivirotto v. Innovative 
Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352–54 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1999).  From 
this it follows that the rejection of the League of Women 
Voters‘ ad did not compel the District Court to rule in the 
Port Authority‘s favor.      
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 Second, the Port Authority contends that the finding of 
viewpoint discrimination was improper because the evidence 
shows that it simply made a mistake in accepting the 
comparator ads.  That is not so.  The evidence shows that the 
Port Authority accepted the comparator ads with full 
knowledge of their contents, which is to say the ads did not 
just ―slip through the cracks.‖  This suggests that, despite the 
written ban on noncommercial ads, the Port Authority 
decided that it would accept noncommercial, rights-education 
advertisements similar to the comparator ads.  See Cuffley, 
208 F.3d at 711 (noting, in a viewpoint-discrimination case, 
that the government‘s ―actions speak louder than its words‖).  
That the Port Authority made this decision and yet rejected 
the coalition‘s advertisement, which was materially 
indistinguishable from the comparator ads, amply establishes 
viewpoint discrimination. 
 A final word about the implications of our decision: in 
upholding the District Court‘s ruling, we do not suggest that 
the Port Authority must accept all noncommercial, rights-
education advertisements going forward.  We hold only that 
the facts of this case indicate viewpoint discrimination, and 
that the coalition is therefore entitled to relief.  If the Port 
Authority were to develop more precisely phrased written 
guidance on the ads for which it will sell advertising space 
and apply the guidance in a neutral and consistent manner, it 
may, in the future, be able to reject ads like the one at issue in 
this appeal.  See AIDS Action Comm., 42 F.3d at 12–13.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
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 The District Judge afforded the parties a fair trial.  He 
patiently listened to five days of testimony, considered an 
extensive set of exhibits, and issued a thoughtful, detailed 
opinion concluding that the Port Authority‘s rejection of the 
coalition‘s ad was motivated by hostility towards the ad‘s 
message.  We see no clear error in the underlying findings, 
and the record fully supports the Judge‘s ruling.  We will 
affirm.    
